Monday, 17 September 2012
Discipline and Punish
Foucault, Michael (1977) Discipline and Punish, New York: Pantheon.
With so much already written about this seminal work, The Differential Association felt the time was come to tackle yet another classic in the criminological world. Discipline and Punish, a theoretical giant in the field, also comes inevitably with a legacy of polarity.
David Garland’s exposition and critique of the work (published in the 1986 American Bar Foundation Research Journal) presents the dichotomy evident in views on Foucault, do we ascribe to him celebrity or notoriety? Indeed, what is Foucault: historian, philosopher, cultural commentator? So mould-breaking was his methodology that his Chair at the Collège de France was in Systems of Thought. The changes wrought by his writings originated the term Foucauldian to assign coherence to the subsequent academics who pursued their own scholarship utilising his approaches. This testament to his influence can be seen in the now ubiquitous use of his concepts, archaeology of knowledge and a ‘history of the present’. Michael Roth, writing in History and Theory in 1981, explicates the process that “Writing a history of the present means writing a history in the present; self-consciously writing in a field of power relations and political struggle”. A seemingly paradoxical phrase, Foucault attempted to explain contemporaneous phenomena by tracing historical roots.
Involved in penal reform and prisoners’ rights, it seemed natural perhaps that Foucault’s interest should turn to the institution of the prison itself. Coming as part of a revisionist history movement in the 1970s, Foucault attempted to trace the origins of prisons, and locate it with a political understanding, using his key concepts of power and knowledge to trace its lineage.
Discipline and Punish is renowned as having one of the most memorable openings of any book within academia - infamously opening with a visceral and disturbing description of the 1757 torture and execution of the regicide Damiens, in Paris, Foucault’s prose is literary and evocative. Contrasting the physicality and spectacle of the torture, Foucault juxtaposes this passage with a timetable for the House of Young Prisoners in
, representing a
precise chopping-up of prisoners’ days into segments of meaningful and
productive activity. Why this radical
shift, accomplished in 80 years, in how we punish? Paris
Foucault asserts that punishment gradually shifted from the body to the mind, with the penitentiary emerging in the early decades of the 19th century as the primary method of punishing offenders, morphing from its previous incarnation as a transitory location prior to trial or punishment, or as a means of confining debtors.
Foucault asserts that prison itself learned the lessons demonstrated by the military, the convent and the school in employing the concept of discipline to achieve control, he traces the extension of the disciplinary gaze to criminals as a means of creating docile bodies, necessary for the emerging modernist economy. Stressing the importance of political economy, or the cost it takes to achieve political objectives, Foucault writes that scaffold riots in the late 18th century, and the precarious mood of the mob at executions, rendered them too costly a means of punishing individuals. The public spectacle of execution and torture no longer worked as a visible reactivation of sovereign power, rather it had become a liability which undermined this power.
The concentration on the mind, or the soul, came at a time when the disciplines were emerging and experts were lining up to pronounce, to categories and to treat, society. The 19th century also saw the emergence of the asylum system in many countries, led by the construction of a string of public asylums in
which revolutionised the
care of insane persons and were themselves the result of changing perceptions
of madness and the mind. Elaine
Showalter writes in The Female Malady that “The substitution of surveillance
for physical restraint may well have imposed a perhaps more absolute kind of restraint
on the insane which implicated their whole being” (at page 49) – these were
contemporaneous concerns, showing that Foucauldian critiques were common much
earlier. It was dehumanising in a
different but equally effective way to restraints. England
Nicola Lacey too writes of changes that chime perfectly with Foucault’s thesis of shifting focus from the body to the mind. In her book From Moll Flanders to Tess of the D’Urbervilles, Lacey writes that in criminal justice, responsibility-attribution in criminal trials went from a purely exterior consideration of ‘did the defendant commit this act’ to questions which focused on the interior, on the soul, asking questions about intention, capacity and motivations.
Historians have reacted with ambivalence towards Foucault, distancing themselves from his method and claiming that his work is rife with cafeteria history, rifling from the sources to select only those which support his thesis. Garland elaborates on many of the key historians who cite the errors in Discipline and Punish, including Speirenburg, Langbein, Beattie, Rothman and Ignatieff who claim that his chronology is flawed, for example that torture began declining from the 1600s was already well on its way out by the mid- to late-18th century. His views that many reformers did not in fact want prison is undermined by the strenuous works of penal reformers who worked extensively within prisons, attempting to make them rehabilitative sites. The decline in violence too over the period, acknowledged by Foucault, is held as an equally persuasive explanation for the change in punishment, occasioned by societal shifts related to state formation.
The nebulous concept of power in Discipline and Punish, not conceived of as Marxist, but relational and dispersed throughout society, poses a problem for some. Foucault’s dismissal or refusal to engage with the agents or sources of power renders the political dimension hollow, apolitical and unrealistic. While this is one of the revolutionary works which linked punishment and state power, work from other researchers, such as Savelsberg and Barker, show us that within the political realm there are institutionalised power relations and political dynamics which complicate political processes. As such, to describe political power in monolithic terms can stunt more probing avenues of research. In the same problematic vein, political will is seamlessly translated into reality with no mention of political opposition or grassroot resistance to certain modes of power and control.
However, despite the seeming dystopian panorama painted by Foucault, he does not conceive of power and control as evil, rather he acknowledges them as essentially productive, hence the beneficial application of it to education, health, the economy and justice.
Other motivations in punishment, beyond those of power and control, include the Durkheimian notion that societies have a desire to punish transgressions.
lists many other emotions underlying the process of punishing, such as justice,
forgiveness, and vengeance. An analysis
which excludes these necessarily omits many realistic and human drives and is
perhaps, incomplete. Garland
So we leave you with more questions, wondering how we can use Foucault’s framework to interpret power and social control today. To what extent can we identify Foucault’s disciplinary gaze in contemporary society? Does the advent of CCTV, Neighbourhood Watch schemes and so on represent the realisation of the Panopticon society, wherein the dispersal of disciplinary techniques renders us all self-regulating bodies?
Is Discipline and Punish relevant to
? Does it ably describe the development of an
Irish prison system? Ireland had a vast ‘carceral archipeligo’, with an
unfathomable number of the population being held in a web of institutions after
the establishment of the Irish Free State. Today there are over 4,000 people prison, however between 1926 and 1951 there was over 30,000 men women
and children coercively confined in Ireland. Does this show that instead there
has been a dramatic loosening of social control and that state power is less
invasive? Many critics have claimed that Foucault’s analysis applies to a
limited number of countries, most perfectly matching France in the 1830s and
1840s and perhaps falling down as a more general description. Ireland
As previously mentioned, Foucault’s writing illustrates an ability to bring to life horrors; he writes unflinchingly and devastatingly about the torture of Damiens, and this elevation of punishment practices from the academic to the alarmingly present is a necessary tool that can sometimes appear lacking in contemporary writings on prisons. That writing can conjure compelling images of punishment should be borne in mind. The work of former Mountjoy Governor John Lonergan illustrates the benefit of openness in prison policy, which can dispel myths and educate a public conditioned to dismiss human rights concerns with statements about holiday camps.
This blog was written by Lynsey Black and Louise Brangan.